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My	contribution	to	this	debate	on	the	future	of	legal	anthropology	takes	up	an	old	concern	
of	the	field,	namely	the	relationship	between	the	anthropology	of	law	and	social	theory.	
Legal	anthropology	has	turned	into	a	strong	sub-discipline	intent	of	studying	the	legal.	This	
has	had	many	very	positive	effects,	but	it	has	also	isolated	the	field	from	broader	
anthropology	and	social	theory.	I	argue	that,	in	order	to	remain	relevant	to	anthropology	
and	to	society,	scholars	of	anthropology	and	law	should	use	their	ethnographic	insights	to	
theorize	beyond	the	field	of	legal	anthropology.	The	following	three	questions	lay	out	what	I	
believe	requires	our	attention:	What	are	we	actually	(currently)	studying?	Do	we	really	know	
enough	about	what	law	is	and	what	it	does	in	people’s	lives?	If	so,	how	can	we	better	
theorize	its	role	in	society?	
What	are	we	studying?	
There	is	a	disjunction	in	what	exactly	scholars	of	the	anthropology	of	law	study.	Some	are	
studying	up	(Nader	1972).	They	study	the	specialists	and	experts	of	law	in	their	institutional	
contexts,	interested	in	how	regulatory	frameworks	emerge	and	are	implemented	by	state	
and	non-state	actors	and	in	their	diffusion	and	adoption	in	different	spheres	and	
geographical	areas.	In	short,	they	are	interested	in	norm-making.		
Other	scholars	study	“down”.	They	study	those	who	have	to	deal	with	the	norms	made	by	
legal	experts;	the	others,	the	laypeople.	Ethnographers	who	study	down	engage	with	
community-grounded	conceptions	of	the	law	in	its	different	forms.	
Both	“up”	and	“down”	scholars	are	sure	that	they	study	how	the	law	is	being	practiced,	but	
the	two	fields	rarely	engage	with	the	other.	Instead,	they	engage	in	a	partition	of	labour	
depending	on	specific	and	differing	conceptions	of	the	law.	In	both	perspectives,	experts	and	
specialists	are	somehow	closer	to	the	structure	of	the	law	(they	make	the	law);	and	that	
those	“below”	fill	in	and	have	to	deal	with	this	structure;	that	is,	they	practice	the	law.	My	
concern	here	is	that	we	create	artificial,	conceptual	boundaries	between	the	makers	and	the	
consumers	of	the	law.	This	might	have	something	to	do	with	the	power	of	word-based	
discourse	and	the	social	status	which	grows	from	written	expertise	(also	among	academics).	
I	believe	we	should	try	harder	to	overcome	the	disjunction	between	these	two	fields	of	
study,	as	they	are	part	of	one	social	field,	to	speak	with	Max	Gluckman.	Overcoming	this	
disjunction	is	not	easy.	There	are	reasons	for	the	disconnect	between	the	fields	and	the	
disparities	of	knowledge	(i.e.	the	experts	and	the	rest).	In	other	words,	we	also	have	to	try	
hard	to	overcome	them	as	researchers	and	undermine	more	self-evidently	the	separation	
between	constructed	types	of	knowledge.	
What	is	law,	and	what	does	it	do?	
As	an	anthropologist	who	is	not	trained	as	a	lawyer,	the	law	remains	ambivalent	to	me	as	an	
object	of	study.	Do	I	need	to	know	as	much	about	the	law	as	lawyers	do	in	order	to	properly	
understand	the	role	of	the	law	in	people’s	lives	–	or	does	it	suffice	to	have	some	kind	of	
lukewarm	knowledge,	similar	to	that	of	my	lay	interlocutors?	While	lack	of	expertise	might	
be	a	problem,	expertise	can	also	be	blinding	because	it	is	overemphasizing	the	role	of	the	
law	in	people’s	lives.	Here	there	are	parallels	to	other	sub-fields	in	anthropology.	Like	the	(ill)	
body	in	medical	anthropology,	the	law	is	often	treated	as	something	exceptional	and	
excluding	instead	of	something	we	all	know,	do	draw	on	and	are	shaped	by.	This	means	that	
we	need	to	study	law	as	part	of	a	holistic	perspective	on	being-in-the-world.	We	should	ask	
how	law-doing	relates	to	politics,	religion,	and	memory.	What	we	need	is	not	a	law	versus	
society	conception	but	a	law	in	society	approach.	
To	illustrate	what	I	mean,	I	give	an	example	from	my	own	research	(Kesselring	2017).	I	went	
out	to	study	the	effects	of	the	legal	discourse	on	apartheid	victims	who	turned	to	US	courts	
in	the	hope	to	see	their	grievances	addressed.	In	the	specific	case,	South	African	victims	sued	
multinational	companies	today	for	damages	relating	to	past	injuries.	In	many	ways,	victims	
are	the	prime	example	to	demonstrate	the	power	of	the	law;	how	the	law	subjects	and	re-
produces	victimization.	It	would	be	seducing	to	argue	that	the	law	keeps	people	in	a	social	
position	where	they	were	when	turning	to	the	courts,	or	even	worse:	how	the	law	turns	
them	into	victims.	Undertaking	this	study,	I	grew	increasingly	confused	about	the	relevance	
and	effects	of	the	legal	discourse.	I	realised	that	there	were	much	more	pressing	questions	
for	victims	than	the	legal	discourse,	such	as:	does	the	law	help	them	to	emancipate	from	
their	victimhood,	and	from	their	bodily	knowledge	of	violence?	How	can	we	understand	the	
lingering	effects	of	violence	in	people’s	lives	–	and	the	role	of	the	law	in	it?	To	better	
understand	how	legal	discourse	works	(or	fails	to	work),	I	had	to	focus	on	the	body	and	
bodily	memory	of	harm.	Anthropology	of	the	body	and	anthropology	of	law	usually	do	not	
engage	with	each	other,	but	I	found	it	impossible	to	say	anything	meaningful	in	the	one	
without	taking	into	account	the	other.	I	was	only	able	to	say	anything	meaningful	about	the	
effects	of	law	by	moving	beyond	the	anthropology	of	law.	Isolating	a	legal	perspective	from	
its	social	context	would	not	merely	have	produced	a	partial	truth,	but	a	half-truth.		
More	general	questions	follow	from	this:	How	is	the	law	produced	as	a	separate	social	field	
with	its	own	logic?	How	far	do	the	proponents	of	the	separation	(including	legal	
anthropologists)	succeed	in	transforming	their	vision	into	reality?	In	what	situations	are	
people	avoiding	or	ignoring	the	law?	How	do	legal	and	non-legal	domains	intersect	in	their	
lives?	If	we	can	better	theorize	the	distinction	between	the	two,	and	the	overlaps	and	shifts	
from	one	to	the	other,	I	believe	we	make	a	contribution	to	social	theory	more	generally.	This	
leads	me	to	my	final	point:	
Theorization	
The	sub-field1	of	the	anthropology	of	law	should	make	its	contribution	–	and	relation	–		to	
social	theory	clearer.	The	‘turbulent	years’	(Moore	2001)	have,	I	think,	been	over	for	too	
long.	Maybe	as	a	result	of	the	institutionalization	and	proliferation	of	legal	anthropology	in	
academia	(which	is	a	success	in	itself,	of	course),	we	take	the	law’s	importance	in	people’s	
lives	for	granted.	This	might	have	been	crucial	for	the	development	of	the	fields,	but	it	is	
now	time	to	go	back	to	social	theories.		
Back	in	1978,	Simon	Roberts	expressed	his	doubts	about	a	“law-centred	analytical	
framework”	(1978,	6)	as	a	convincing	outlook	on	society.	The	question	to	me	is	not	so	much	
whether	we	should	adopt	“our	own	folk	categories”	(as	opposed	to	“the	legal”	proper),	as	
Roberts	pondered,	and	where	exactly	to	draw	the	line	of	what	“legal”	should	mean	in	
analytical	terms.	I	am	not	doubting	the	value	of	“the	law”	as	a	category	for	analytical	
purposes	–	although	I	do	see	the	challenges	and	problems	(cf.	Greenhouse	1982).	My	
concern	is	that,	if	we	separate	the	legal	from	the	social,	one	of	the	many	consequences	is	
that	we	misconceive	the	law	as	discourse-as-words	only.	Looking	at	current	scholarship	on	
anthropology	and	law,	I	fear	that	focusing	on	the	law	(however	defined)	has	indeed	enticed	
us	to	primarily	focus	on	the	discursive	level	of	human	interaction	as	informed	by	Foucault	
(Goodale	2017,	35).	This	ignores	that	law,	social	order	and	conflict	are	human	categories	
																																																						
1	Contrary	to	Mark	Goodale,	I	believe	that	legal	anthropology	has	reached	sub-disciplinary	status	(Goodale	
2005,	947)	
which	are	lived,	embodied,	and	enacted,	and	this	cannot	be	captured	in	words,	legal	texts	
and	judicial	activities	only.	The	legal	field	is	nothing	exceptional,	nor	is	it	necessarily	relevant.	
To	understand	its	place	in	people’s	lives,	we	must	situate	its	working	(and	limits)	in	relation	
to	other	discursive	formations.		
Against	this	concern,	I	suggest	a	twist	to	Roberts’	question	of	“what	do	we	gain	in	insisting	
that	a	particular	mode	of	action	is	‘legal’,	whereas	another	is	not?”	(Roberts	1978,	7)	by	
asking:	what	do	we	lose	if	we	insist	on	studying	the	law?	For	the	future	of	the	anthropology	
of	law,	this	can	mean	a	number	of	things.	The	sub-field	might	dissolve	into	a	general	
anthropology.	More	likely,	however,	the	anthropology	of	law	will	remain	prominent.	In	
order	to	remain	relevant,	though,	we	should	always	take	clues	from	other	sub-fields,	and	
thereby	develop	anthropology,	the	social	sciences	and,	ultimately,	social	theory	further.	
Otherwise,	we	run	the	danger	of	doing	a	self-referential	exercise	and	a	limited	social	
analysis,	of	leaving	anthropology	to	others	–	and,	worst	of	all,	of	losing	touch	with	society.	
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